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Collaborative Mixed-Reality (CMR) applications are gaining interest in a wide range
of areas including games, social interaction, design and health-care. To date, the
vast majority of published work has focused on display technology advancements,
software, collaboration architectures and applications. However, the potential security
concerns that affect collaborative platforms have received limited research attention. In
this position paper, we investigate the challenges posed by cyber-security threats to CMR
systems. We focus on how typical network architectures facilitating CMR and how their
vulnerabilities can be exploited by attackers, and discuss the degree of potential social,
monetary impacts, psychological and other harms that may result from such exploits.
The main purpose of this paper is to provoke a discussion on CMR security concerns.
We highlight insights from a cyber-security threat modelling perspective and also propose
potential directions for research and development toward better mitigation strategies. We
present a simple, systematic approach to understanding a CMR attack surface through
an abstraction-based reasoning framework to identify potential attack vectors. Using this
framework, security analysts, engineers, designers and users alike (stakeholders) can
identify potential Indicators of Exposures (IoE) and Indicators of Compromise (IoC). Our
framework allows stakeholders to reduce their CMR attack surface as well understand
how Intrusion Detection System (IDS) approaches can be adopted for CMR systems.
To demonstrate the validity to our framework, we illustrate several CMR attack surfaces
through a set of use-cases. Finally, we also present a discussion on future directions this
line of research should take.
Keywords: collaborative mixed reality, cyber security, attack modelling, attack surface, harm
1. INTRODUCTION
Virtual Reality (VR), Augmented Reality (AR), and Mixed Reality (MR) are receiving significant
attention and the scale of deployment of the full spectrum of Extended Reality (XR) experiences is
considerable. XR refers to all combinations of real-and-virtual environments and includes
elements of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). It is used as an umbrella term for VR, AR,
MR and broader experiences incorporating sensors/wearables. Recent reports predict the global
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market for XR hardware, software, and services will reach US
$200 billion by 2021 (https://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20180227005719/en/Global-Augmented-Reality-Mixed-
Reality-Market-Outlook and https://www.statista.com/statistics/
591181/global-augmented-virtual-reality-market-size/). This
rapid acceptance of XR technologies into a broad range of
mainstream applications will result in applications being
targeted by criminals. A benign, but creative, example entitled
“hello, we’re from the internet,” demonstrates the ease by which
application security can be breached. In this case, a group of
artists curated an unauthorised virtual gallery consisting of
work from eight artists drawn over notable digitised paintings
displayed in an AR environment at the Museum of Modern
Art (MoMA) (see https://next.reality.news/news/indie-artists-
invade-moma-with-augmented-reality-reimagine-jackson-
pollocks-works-0183271/).
Collaborative Mixed Reality (CMR) as described
by Billinghurst and Kato (1999), extends Milgram and Kishino
(1994)’s definition of MR to collaborative interfaces. The broad
range of input/output (I/O) sensor technologies available
today, means that CMRs can involve live tracking and/or
sensor data incorporated into the Virtual Environment (VE)
and represented (in some way) to the user. Consequently,
users might not have a common set of interfaces to access
a single shared VE. As such, the shared VE represents some
combination of the real space of many users, combined with a
synthetic model. Users can potentially collaborate using many
different forms of sensors, data and interfaces. Recent advances
suggest that within a few years time, hardware and software
will render such CMR platforms more straightforward for
mainstream use. For instance, Facebook recently released a
social VR demo at Oculus Connect 2016 (https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=YuIgyKLPt3s), and Singh (see https://medium.
com/@karansher/towards-stronger-human-connections-in-
ar-vr-xr-53544bf6b10d) discusses how AR and VR might
blur the distinction between our digital and physical reality.
CMR research and development has also seen a renaissance
with key actors such as Oculus Rift (https://www.oculus.com/)
and HTC Vive (https://www.vive.com/uk/) in the VR space
and highly popular AR games such as Pokemon GO (https://
www.pokemongo.com/en-gb/) and Zombies Run! (https://
zombiesrungame.com/).
In parallel to advances in CMR, there has been a substantial
rise in research in cyber security research. This has focused
on the Internet of Things (IoT), online games and Web
applications. Most of this examines how new capabilities will
affect attack surfaces (see Manadhata and Wing, 2010), as well
as identify mechanisms to combat threats posed to these systems.
Zhang et al. (2014) for instance outline challenges and research
opportunities, Whitmore et al. (2015) provide a survey of topics
and trends, Miessler (2015) discuss practitioner approaches to
mapping out attack surfaces of IoT devices, and Happa et al.
(2018) propose an ethics framework for research, development
and deployment of heterogeneous systems that may not yet be
fully defined or understood. Security research in the IoT space has
progressed further than that in the CMR space, and significant
overlaps exist (particularly on the attack surface consequences
of interactions between heterogeneous sensors), thus we see it
necessary to also review this literature.
In online virtual environments, the overall evolution of the
world/model is both complex and distributed. There are many
incentives and mechanisms to cheat (see Jeff Yan and Choi,
2002; Yan and Randell, 2005). These include; misplacing trust,
collusion, abusing game procedure, manipulating virtual assets,
exploiting machine intelligence, modifying client infrastructure,
denying service to peer players, timing cheating, compromising
authentication, exploiting bugs, compromising game servers,
insider threats and social engineering. All these exploit the
asymmetric availability of information within the game world
(which takes this beyond normal problems of distributed
applications, where the main attacks target the wire protocols,
or central databases). Attacker objectives can vary and include
bullying, hijacking online players’ identities, obtaining virtual
commodities, obtaining real money, achieving reputation
damage and achieving political consequences. Bono et al. (2009)
present an in-depth discussion on the importance of reducing
the attack surface of Massively Multi-player Online Role-Playing
Games (MMORPGs), given that a vulnerable game can leave
many game instances compromised.
A wide range of collaboration platforms exist that use the
Web or the Internet. These can be telepresence related, see Steuer
(1992) and Szigeti et al. (2009), or Web platforms such as
“its learnings” (https://itslearning.com/uk/) and “blackboard”
(https://www.blackboard.com). Collaboration platforms are not
limited to meetings or learning, and often aid users to achieve a
common goal. Examples exist in the Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) community, which has examined Collaborative Intrusion
Detection Systems (CIDSs) for sharing Cyber Threat Intelligence
(CTI) across different platforms (see Wagner et al., 2016; Giubilo
et al., 2017; Happa, 2017; Nair et al., 2018). While these are
driven by automation in sending event logs, the importance of
making good use of the combination of automation and human
analysts cognition cannot be understated. Together, these allow
for enhanced decision making against detected cyber attacks.
Collaborative platforms that allow for multi-user engagement
through shared multi-modal experiences (see Axon et al., 2018)
may enhance cyber security decision making through shared
virtual environments, but these systems also need protecting.
1.1. Paper Contributions
A key motivation of this position paper, is to deliver a framework
that assists stakeholders (e.g., security analysts, engineers,
designers and users) to systematically identify and consider
unknown, or poorly understood threats posed by attackers. This
paper aims to formulate a starting point for understanding
the security challenges of MR and CMR through provoking a
discussion on CMR-security concerns, with the aim of helping
stakeholders develop robust security solutions. We highlight
insights from cyber-security threat modelling and propose key
detection, mitigation, combat and deterrence strategies. Security
concerns relate to how stakeholders can better understand the
MR and CMR attack surface. We propose a general framework
from which stakeholders can identify potential Indicators of
Exposures (IoE) and Indicators of Compromise (IoC). Defense
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strategies relate to how stakeholders can reduce the attack surface
of applications, as well as how Intrusion Detection System-like
(IDS) and Intrusion Prevention System-like (IPS) approaches
(see Liao et al., 2013) might be both adapted and deployed for
CMR environments.
The contributions of this paper are:
• An outline of grand challenges in security for CMR
applications. This serves as a roadmap, highlighting key
research, development and deployment challenges (in
security) across various stakeholders.
• An in-depth investigation of attacks on CMR systems. Our
investigation is informed by research in MR, as currently
there is little investigation in CMR. We include identifying
socio-technical properties of attacks (e.g., psychology, finance,
reputation) as well as more traditional technology-centric
perspectives (e.g., malware). We present this in the form of
a framework, built from a handful of models and a novel and
extendable CMR attack taxonomy. This taxonomy can be used
to identify and quantify attack behaviors to predict subsequent
harms and impacts.
• An analysis of security use cases of CMR applications. The
aim is to illustrate why these grand challenges need to be
addressed and develop our starting taxonomy. We specifically
consider use cases of Intellectual Property theft, Virtual try on,
a Virtual doctor and Gaming.
• An outline of how existing and new defense approaches can
defend against CMR attacks through detection, mitigation,
combat and deterrence.
We begin by discussing related work and detailing key challenge
areas relevant to CMR applications. Then we present the security
related properties of CMRs together with our threat modelling
assumptions, to motivate our choice of framework models. We
then detail our framework showing how each of our models work
together to help stakeholdersmakemore well-informed decisions
about security issues, attacks and attack surfaces. We present our
taxonomy and show how this is used to reason about the attack
surface of a set of CMR use cases. Finally, we discuss specific
defense mechanisms and how these may work within the context
of CMR applications and finish with future directions of research
and concluding remarks.
1.2. Related Work
Traditionally, when discussing security of systems, CIA
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) are considered the
properties of systems that we wish to protect Cherdantseva
and Hilton (2013). Confidentiality relates to data or systems
only being disclosed to appropriate parties. Integrity relates to
data or systems only being modifiable by appropriate parties.
Availability relates to data and systems being accessible. Other
properties exist that fall within the CIA triad, such as: Non-
repudiation, Authorisation, Authentication, Anonymity and
Unobservability among others. In CMR security, CIA can
relate to, e.g., how compromising an application might result in
leaking a user’s personal data onto the CMR platform through
its graphical interface, or some actions or behaviour by a CMR
user which is signalled as being private, but is broadcast to a
wide audience (confidentiality). These are two examples that
could cause financial harm or reputational harm. Furthermore,
words and actions by a user can be scrambled (integrity), or
parts of the CMR application can been rendered unavailable
(availability). For important meetings this may have business
consequences. Security of social aspects and harms are still
poorly understood, as discussed by Agrafiotis et al. (2016) and
worthy of detailed consideration.
CMR security literature is very limited. There has been some
prior work on security and privacy challenges and approaches
in MR such as the work by De Guzman et al. (2018). The
authors survey the landscape of the published literature in the
field and report that<2% of AR/MR literature investigates topics
of security and privacy. In contrast to De Guzman et al. (2018)
who provide a data-centric categorisation-approach based on a
historical understanding of input/data access/output protection
strategies, particularly focusing on target technical security and
privacy properties, we consider a much wider gamut for the
attack surface. Our approach includes non-technical aspects of
the attack surface (psychological, financial, reputational harms)
and we provide an attack modelling tactic and guidelines to
consider present day as well as likely future types of attacks
in the CMR landscape. This wider look at the threat landscape
enables us to identify socio-technical harms of attacks. By socio-
technical harms, we mean psychological, emotional, financial,
reputation or other non-technical damage to users, in addition to
the technical harms typically discussed in cyber security works.
We believe a socio-technical approach to attack modelling in
the CMR space will be required to comprehensively prepare for
future types of attacks.
Early research into MR focused on categorising the
technologies themselves. Milgram and Kishino (1994)
presented a taxonomy of MR displays on a reality-virtuality
contiunuum. Benford et al. (1996) described the idea of a
shared space and CMR, breaking down concepts such as
transportation, arteficiality and spatiality. Many early works,
as highlighted by De Guzman et al. (2018) focus on challenges
related to performance, alignment, interfacing, visualisation,
mobility of MR.
Ethics considerations and value-sensitive design, have also
been stressed to push the boundaries of research into topics such
as data ownership, privacy, secrecy and integrity protection of
AR systems, as discussed by Roesner et al. (2014a). They define
a roadmap for protecting computer security and privacy of AR
systems by considering new security and privacy challenges, such
as the complex set of always-on input sensors. These include
cameras, GPS, microphones, platforms that can run multiple
applications simultaneously, including interfacing with other AR
systems and output devices such as displays, and earphones.
Billinghurst and Kato (1999) review MR techniques for
developing Computer Supported Collaborative Work (CSCW)
interfaces and describe lessons learned from developing a
variety of collaborative MR interfaces. The authors develop
several examples, demonstrating how user experiences with their
interfaces facilitate collaboration in a natural manner, enabling
people to use normal gestures and non-verbal behaviour in
face-to-face and remote collaboration.
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Stevens (2006) discusses CopyBots in Second Life. Copybots
enable attackers to copy and export (by re-uploading) locally
stored content, including animations, clothing, gestures, meshes
and sounds. Being able to copy virtual items, through the uses of
scripts, poses challenges with regards to Intellectual Property and
end-user rights.
Lofgren and Fefferman (2007) reviews one of the first VE
epidemics, in World of Warcraft (https://worldofwarcraft.com/).
A release from Sept 2005, granted access to an area known
as “Zul’Gurub.” In this area, higher-level players avatars were
affected by a virtual disease known as “corrupted blood.” This
infection was an inconvenience, designed to make combat in this
area more challenging and slowly drain life from players. Once
the high-level characters returned to the main areas of the game,
their pets could still be aﬄicted by the disease. Due to a bug,
the disease was able to unintentionally leave the high-level area,
and quickly kill lower-level characters in other parts of the game.
Balicer (2007) studied how we can model infectious diseases
through online role-playing games, and “Corrupted blood” is
mentioned as an example of how a potential attack might affect a
shared VE.
Mennecke et al. (2007) presents a roadmap for research on
virtual worlds and highlights some security and trust concerns.
The security concerns focus on e-commerce, demonstrating a
need for clarity and transparency on when actions are secure, and
privacy is assured.
Oliveira et al. (2009) discuss interoperability between different
solutions, despite several solutions sharing great functional
overlap. The paper presents a broad domain analysis on shared
virtual environments, providing readers with a sense of how the
parts are connected in a greater whole. The authors also propose
solutions to resolve the fragmentation in this space, which they
label the Analysis Domain Model. This model loosely inspires our
view on the attack surface.
D’Antoni et al. (2013) argues that AR applications and non-
mouse/keyboard user inputs need to be natively supported by
operating systems. The authors propose that sensitive data may
be mixed in with user inputs, and discuss research directions
to solve these privacy concerns by having multiple applications
share one instance of the augmented reality. From a resource
perspective, we argue this is a reasonable approach in that it
limits a user’s digital footprint and unifies inputs, processing and
outputs of any AR system. It is unclear whether such a system
could lead to a single point of failure, in which the adversary
is only required to have elevated privileges to manipulate the
entirety of the shared AR space, unless additional access controls
are implemented to support this paradigm (such as sandboxing).
Jana et al. (2013) expands on D’Antoni et al.’s work,
proposing a new operating system abstraction: the recogniser.
The recogniser takes raw sensor data and provides higher-
level objects such as skeletons or faces to applications. The
authors propose a permissions-based system at different levels
of granularity, and demonstrate this on Windows with 87 AR
applications and four recognisers. They also demonstrate a
visualisation to show users how data (related to privacy) is
exposed, and survey 462 participants to establish a privacy
ordering over recognisers.
Vilk et al. (2015) discuss privacy concerns from the raw
data from novel input devices, by examining how they may
emerge on the Web. They demonstrate a proof of concept that
projects Web page content across multiple surfaces in a room,
and runs across multiple mobile platforms taking natural user
inputs. The browser is designed with privacy in mind, taking
the principle of least privilege into account when projecting and
managing content displayed. The authors conduct a user survey
to demonstrate the revealed information was acceptable.
Madary and Metzinger (2016) discuss the potential for deep
behaviourmanipulation, in the context of VEs that can be quickly
modified with the goal of influencing behaviour. This point is
quite critical to consider, as the risk of harm to users of MR
applications can be magnified through hackers manipulating
users. With these factors of plasticity and potential for deep
behaviour manipulation being a specific concern in rich MR
environments. The harm possible with cyber threats can be
significantly greater than the monetary costs alone from a data
security breach.
Lebeck et al. (2017, 2018) investigate how to secure AR
output by tackling risks associated with malicious or buggy
AR output. These risks can compromise safety of users, if an
application accidentally or intentionally obscures output of other
AR applications. The authors demonstrate a novel platform
(Arya) to tackle this issue. Arya is an AR platform that controls
application output according to a set of policies specified in their
framework (see Roesner et al., 2014b). The authors add support
for recognisers (from Jana et al., 2013) to detect objects. Arya
exists between applications and the output drivers.
Sluganovic et al. (2017) discuss how existing methods to
secure device pairing are not directly applicable to AR headsets
as they: (1) assume single-user controls on two devices (when
AR systems involve two users, each with their own device,
users should not be required to take them off), and (2) they
do not assume that an adversary can fully eavesdrop the out-
of-band communication. The authors demonstrate the design
and evaluation of HoloPair: a system for secure and usable
pairing of two AR headset. This pairing protocol, along with
its implementation, is evaluated with 22 participants. The study
demonstrates a need for multi-device pairing protocols and
shows how security for such devices is sometimes assumed to
be sufficient for AR platforms. We suspect security protocols
for CMR systems, such as the one in this paper will play a
significantly larger role in the future.
Han et al. (2018) discusses how heterogeneous devices will
be required to have a shared reference point, and for certain
environments, different modalities will make this challenging to
achieve. The authors propose a context-based pairingmechanism
that uses time as the common factor across differing sensor types.
Their system creates event fingerprints, matched across different
IoT devices, for autonomous pairing purposes.
Alrawi et al. (2019) proposes a methodology to analyse
security properties of IoT devices. The authors systematise the
literature for smart home IoT devices to summarise key attack
techniques, mitigation and stakeholders. They demonstrate these
for 45 devices to identify neglected areas of research. While
not directly relevant to this body of work, IoT devices are
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likely to share many capabilities that can be attacked in a
similar way.
Other ethics considerations relating to heterogeneous systems
have been considered in IoT research (see van den Hoven, 2012;
Wachtel, 2012; Baldini et al., 2018). We believe many of these
ethical concerns will affect CMR applications as well:
• Incentives for businesses and other threat actors so they
do not manipulate users or users’ data, see for instance
the Cambridge Analytica case (see Persily, 2017) (Note that
throughout this paper we use the term users to indicate
potential victims of attacks. While it is more precise to use
the term data subjects (EUGeneral Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) terminology), we employ the term users to avoid
confusion for non-privacy/security readers).
• Increasing user awareness of data processing. A user needs
to see the complete set of data as well as understanding what
that data can be used for, to make a rational choice about how
their data can be treated and the level of security they need.
• Psychological biases, Users have different perceptions of risk,
and risk appetites. Reducing psychological biases will be vital
to increase robustness and resilience against attacks.
• Accountability of applications regarding users privacy. This
is less of an issue for EU citizens with the introduction
of GDPR.
• Miniaturisation and invisibility. It is important to keep
technology visible for inspection, audit, quality control and
accountability. If users are unaware of their existence, they
cannot know how their attack surface is increased.
• Ambiguity and ontology. It is necessary to deal with unclear
criteria of identity and system boundaries, as the distinctions
between objects artefacts and human beings blur together.
• Identification. More andmore seemingly insignificant devices
are being assigned identities. What should the rules be for
assigning, administering and managing these identities? This
concern, combined with the miniaturisation of devices, means
that systems can perform background processing related
to identity, without users being aware of how they are
being monitored.
• Mediation and autonomous agency. Heterogeneous devices
provide ways of extending and augmenting human agency.
We need to consider how to ensure appropriate automated
data-processing and decision-making.
• Embedded “smart” capabilities. Smart objects may embed
intelligence/knowledge function as devices become external
extensions to the human body. In the context of CMR, we
envisage that devices with remote capabilities can predict what
we recognise, choices we make and patterns of behaviour,
facilitated by XR capabilities. For instance, AR can produce
names of people on screen on your behalf linking them to
other databases.
• Seamless transfers invoking unpredictability and
uncertainty. Information flow may become invisible to
end-users, which may raise concerns about whether people
understand how their data is being handled.
A recent overlap between VR and security focuses on how
to facilitate cyber threat training scenarios. Kabil et al.
(2018) describes the use of CVEs to improve users cyber
situational awareness. Piskozub et al. (2017) also describe ways
to augment decision-makers’ understanding of cyber-physical
situational awareness, through VR simulations. This prior work
focuses on how VR/MR can enhance security capabilities. In
contrast, we discuss the security of the devices and the CMR
environment itself.
2. GRAND CHALLENGES
When deriving grand challenges, we need to explore the
asymmetric relationship between attackers and defenders in
the context of CMR systems in a systematic manner. Through
analyzing the roles, vulnerabilities and exploits of CMR systems
we can contribute to security standards and provide meaningful
use cases. We need to investigate a plethora of issues, examples
include; socio-technical manipulation, breach of confidentiality,
or rendering a system unusable through a denial of service
attack. De Guzman et al. (2018) present a list of open challenges.
This includes discussions on topics pertaining to: security and
privacy of existing devices and platforms; regulation of MR
applications; native support between applications; targeted data
protection; user welfare, society, policy, and ethics; profitability
and interoperability; networking challenges; smart futures. We
extend these further:
• Challenge Area 1: CMR attacks and attack surfaces. This
includes modelling the behaviours of attackers in the context
of CMR devices, how users interact with them and how
attackers can exploit this to their advantage. We can do so,
by developing in-depth use cases of attacks, but also explore
different techniques to express behaviour of systems, users
and attackers, including for instance UML, Message Sequence
Charts, Flow Charts, Attack Graphs or Formal Methods
(including model checking and protocol analysis).
• Challenge Area 2: CMR attack impacts and harms.
Measuring direct and indirect socio-technical consequences of
CMR attacks, including the complex dependencies of harms
and their relationships with one another is a challenge. While
we can use tools such as the Common Vulnerability Score
System (see Scarfone and Mell, 2009) to compute a quantified
measurement of a vulnerability’s technical impact, being able
to measure its follow-on impacts or harms at the socio-
technical level is a far from trivial task.
• ChallengeArea 3: CMR ethics and norms. Within the context
of CMRs, what represents good and bad (bad here relating
to nefarious and inappropriate, but not malicious) behaviour?
How might the boundaries and definitions behaviour evolve
over time? For example, when might teasing in a CMR cross
the boundary into bullying.
• Challenge Area 4: Effective tools and techniques to:
– Detect CMR attacks, including proactive and reactive
measures. Proactive measures can include identifying how
the education of stakeholders can improve resilience and
robustness to attacks, also allowing engineers, programmers
and designers to make better informed decisions w.r.t.
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developing CMR applications. Key challenges exist in
education in cyber security as people need be able and
willing to apply their understanding. This may require
changes in attitudes and intentions (see Bada and Sasse,
2014) when developing and/or using systems. Reactive
means include uses of IDS-like approaches, such as misuse
detection or anomaly detection systems (see Liao et al., 2013
for a state-of-the-art literature review on the subject, host-
based and network-based solutions for detection at optimal
locations on a system and architecture or infrastructure to
best identify attacks.
– Mitigate CMR attacks. By exploring robustness and
resilience of systems, we can withstand attacks and also
recover faster. An aspect of this challenge, should perhaps
cover IPS-like systems in which we develop systems that
automate defensive actions in the interests of the integrity
of the CMR system.
– Combat CMR attacks. We need to explore the incident
responses that are the most efficient, effective and
appropriate. Can we combat attacks (offensively), or
should defenses remain passive like in most current
defense systems?
– Deter CMR attacks. Can we identify means to prevent
attacks from occurring in the first place? Once approach
might be to harden hardware and software (minimise
software installed and hardware used, while also making
sure these are always up to date with the latest security
patches) to reduce the attack surface with the aim of
reducing the attacker’s appetite for targeting the system or
users in the first place.
3. CMR PROPERTIES RELATING TO
SECURITY
Many collaborative mixed reality systems employ a client-server
architecture. This is partially due to the complexity of services
required, but also because a central point provides easy discovery
and network packet reflection across heterogeneous connections.
For example, one current CMR system, High Fidelity, has a fairly
complex network architecture because of the services it provides:
content streaming, audio mixing, currency and marketplace
services and naming (https://blog.highfidelity.com/high-fidelity-
system-architecture-f30a7ba89f80).
Tools to build centralised servers are well supported in
common development toolkits such as Unity and Unreal. Many
smaller scale systems use peer to peer networking strategies.
For example, the Oculus Platform SDK has examples for
achieving this with avatar support (https://developer.oculus.
com/documentation/platform/latest/concepts/dg-rooms/). Such
technologies have evolved from similar tools for desktop, mobile
and console games, so the technological and architectural issues
are necessarily similar (Jeff Yan and Choi, 2002; Yan, 2003;
McGraw and CTO, 2008).
A number of security-related properties are essential to
consider in CMR applications, these include:
• Network communication architecture. The topology of the
network can affect where malicious attacks may be targeted.
For example in a classical client-server architecture, attacking
a server with a denial of service attack is an obvious choice.
• Social interaction. Social interaction, spatial constraints,
facilitating collaborative access (see Pettifer and Marsh, 2001;
Tolone et al., 2005), proximity to other users, the use of
space as access control (see Bullock and Benford, 1999) and
programmed access controls (see Wright and Madey, 2010)
can all potentially be exploited by an attacker.
• Impact of immersion. The impact of having users engaged
with a system that is immersive, can cause psychological harm
(see Stanney et al., 1998; Lawson, 2015;Madary andMetzinger,
2016). An attacker could manipulate a CMR to cause further
psychological harm. There are parallels emerging in studies of
social media addiction and depression Tandoc et al. (2015)
• Software considerations. Downloading code to run on a local
device also has an impact. Similar issues exist with appmodels,
signed code, etc. It is necessary for security considerations to
understand the limitations of this kind of model. Extensible
run-time is generally not a well-researched topic outside the
Web and server centre domain (e.g., Docker https://www.
docker.com/), see Sallés et al. (2002).
Untethered AR/MR devices bring some interesting implications
for MR network communication. In particular, the interest
in network communication over 5G cellular infrastructure
will necessitate smart ways to deal with balancing of
local/remote computation, local compositing and network
access to resources for maintaining synthetic environments. The
network architectural requirements and pros and cons of various
distribution architectures are outside the scope of this work so
we refer the reader to Bastug et al. (2017).
There is a considerable body of research on network
architectures specifically for CVEs, CMEs, and networked games
(see Steed and Oliveira, 2009). A number of early works in
VR proposed various ways to maintain persistent VE state over
varied network architectures (see for example DIVE Benford
et al., 1995 MASSIVE Greenhalgh et al., 2000, DEVA Pettifer
et al., 2000, and NPSNETMacedonia et al., 1994). More recently,
data and state models have also been explored in networked
gaming (see for instance Hawkins et al., 1999; Hu et al., 2006).
We classify client server as an architecture in which there is
one locus of control, this may be on a cloud server, virtualised
(seeMarsh et al., 2006) or may exist on a single server.We classify
broadly peer-to-peer as device to device communication where
only minimal state information is held by two independent loci
of control that are kept in synchrony through message passing
of some sort (see Steed and Oliveira, 2009 for further details on
network architectures). This is important from the perspective
of threat modelling. For this reason, we will consider use case
applications that fit into these network categories.
3.1. Adversary Model and Assumptions
We focus on CMR applications particularly because of
the (as yet) largely unexplored socio-technical aspects of
harms in this space, including consequences in human
Frontiers in ICT | www.frontiersin.org 6 April 2019 | Volume 6 | Article 5
Happa et al. Cyber Security in Collaborative Mixed-Reality
perception, immersion and presence. We also consider financial,
reputational, political, cultural, psychological (and health more
broadly), see Agrafiotis et al. (2016). De Guzman et al. (2018),
as discussed, presents a data-centric approach to MR security,
we argue that a wider, socio-technical perspective is necessary to
be comprehensive. In contrast to Madary and Metzinger (2016)
we do not discuss the broader ethical considerations of these
technologies, beyond how they relate to attacks.
Attacks are actuated threats, with the explicit intent to cause
harm. Outcomes of attacks can be successful, unsuccessful or
have degrees of impact and harms.We assume the adversary to be
a perfect and fully potent attacker, like in Roscoe and Goldsmith
(1997)’s model. If the attacker can be successful, then they
are always (perfect), and the maximum harm/impact is always
achieved (fully potent). This methodology gives a simple worst-
case approach to reasoning about attacker behaviour and enables
us to consider the security of CMR systems deterministically.
The attacker requires no prior knowledge of potential flaws in
the system; instead, we take an exploratory approach in the
attempt to exhaustively investigate socio-technical harms (e.g.,
CIA, nausea, trauma, manipulation, reputational, financial etc.)
that can arise from an MR attack.
Since our approach is open-ended, we can in principle model
the attack surface and goals (of attackers), and behaviour based
on known and reasonable assumptions. This open-endedness
leaves room for future attacks to be detailed, once we know
more about the attack surface in future years. Adversaries may
have a copy of the CMR system to hand, but hardware access
may not be a requirement for all kinds of attacks. The CMR
system is assumed to connect to a service as part of a client-server
architecture. We assume three types of adversaries:
• Non-users of the CMR system. Adversaries are not users of
the CMR system, but instead attempt to hack the system for
nefarious purposes.
• Legitimate users of a CMR system are assumed to have to
authenticate in CMR systems. Wemake no assumptions about
whether identity verification is required, only that activities in
a CMR application, will be tied to a user account.
• Legitimate administrators of a CMR system have
administration privileges. These can be abused (insider
threat). Adversaries may also wish to obtain escalated
privileges in order to reach a large audience or target a
particular user, and some attacks may require this type of
capability in order to execute the attack.
We do not consider attackers without the intention to cause
harm, this means that we will not be covering acts of god
(natural hazards outside human control), benign attacks/threats
(those that cannot cause harm) or accidental threats. We also
exclude accidental attacks, (accidental consequences, but the
intention of the attack is still there). For an in-depth discussion
on our starting points, please see Cohen (1997a,b) which
both discuss properties of attacks and defenses, respectively.
Agrafiotis et al. (2016) discusses harms, and De Guzman
et al. (2018) presents a literature survey of security in the
MR space.
4. A FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND THE
CMR ATTACK SURFACE
Our extendable framework uses three models. These are: the
Environment AttackModel, the Data and State AttackModel and
the I/O Attack model. Each sub-part of the framework looks at
the attack surface through a different lens enabling reasoning at
various different levels of abstraction.
4.1. Overview
We can combine three models to form the basis of our
framework, which can be reasoned about through an attack
taxonomy. Each model works as a lens (see Figure 1) by
providing a different representation of understanding attackers
and attacks. These include:
• Environment Attack Model: considers how the attacker uses
their environment (Threat Environment, TE) to compromise
or otherwise influence the System and Virtual Environment
(SE, VE respectively) (see Figure 2).
• Data and State Attack Model: considers how the attacker can
use lateral movement across different states of systems as well
as subsystems to achieve their goals (see Figure 3).
• I/O Attack Model: considers how the attacker can
compromise the SE and VE through exposures of
vulnerabilities in the Inputs, Boxes, Outputs and Integration
(see Figure 4).
By considering how attackers relate to their environments; how
they may navigate in a stateful publish/subscriber-like system;
and finally: how they can target the attack surface of the SE
in question, we can systematically consider a set of building
blocks to reason about attacks themselves. This should allow
analysts to form a comprehensive understanding of how attacks
can affect the attack surface and predict what risk-owners need
to do in response. This is by no means a complete solution, and
we anticipate the need for other models to extend ours. The
following sections provide more information about each model
in the framework as well as the taxonomy itself.
4.2. Environment Attack Model
When discussing computer graphics and attack modelling, there
is an overlap in vocabulary. We recognise it is necessary
to decouple the terms in order to discuss “environments”
in more meaningful ways. In attack modelling and model
checking, the term environment is often used to describe the
set of external factors that can affect a system. In computer
graphics, environment can both refer to the real environment,
virtual environments and combinations of both found in AR
systems. The environment can also refer to the physical system’s
topology (e.g., a network topology) in which a device or
threat exist.
For the purposes of this paper, we distinguish these terms
as follows. VE denotes any synthetic or imaginary environment
(software and models see Ellis, 1989). We use SE (typically often
referred to as simply System) as the technology landscape in on
which the VE is generated. Finally, we use Threat Environment
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FIGURE 1 | An overview of how to use our framework. Each model acts as a lens for our taxonomy. Our framework assumes that other models can be used to
reason about the attack. The purpose of the framework is to use the taxonomy from different perspectives to achieve a more holistic view of CMR applications, in
order to identify possible vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies. Note this figure is an overview, bigger images can be found in Figures 2–4 and Table 1.
(TE) to denote the space in which attackers operate. This is where
attackers make use of software, hardware and even knowledge
resources outside of IT administrators’ control. We consider
these environments having direct relationships with each other,
as illustrated in Figure 2. In a CMR application, we can say that
the attacker can operate outside the realm of the CMR space.
In the TE, attackers intrude with the intention to directly or
indirectly engage with the SE in order to compromise it or the VE,
as shown in Figure 2. In the figure, we see that external factors or
behaviour of the attacker can affect the system.
Reducing the attack surface of the SE and VE becomes
challenging since for security analysts to understand the attack
surface, they require rights to potentially privileged information
on devices in order to map their capabilities, capacities and
ability to withstand an attack. However, for CMR applications,
especially those in which any device can connect to the SE
and VE, IT administrators of such a system are unlikely to
be able to easily obtain this information. This means that it
is nigh impossible for stakeholders to obtain a comprehensive
view of the attack surface. Thus, suggesting that the (already
worrisome) asymmetric relationship between attacker and
defender (in the attacker’s favour, i.e., the attacker needs only
to be successful once to compromise a system) is particularly
problematic and needs to be considered in-depth by CMR
application stakeholders.
In the following subsections we describe the necessary threat
model assumptions, along with the attack surface of each of the
constituent components: Input, (black/grey/white) Box, Output
and finally the Integration of the previous components. Note: as
the TE exists outside the bounds of what analysts are privy to, any
assumption wemake about the TEwill be speculation or based on
heuristics from attacker history. We assume that any third-party
dependencies to a CMR application, is a part of that SE.
4.3. Data and State Attack Model
We envisage CMR systems making greater use of sensors,
cameras, on-body/off-body networks, wearable, implants etc. The
inherent implication of having rich variation in sensors and
interfaces that each connected user might have at their disposal,
is that I/O to/from the VE from users will substantially differ
between users. If we see sensor I/O to/from a CMR as a local
contribution to a shared VE’s state, then the state of the whole
CMR itself will be dependent on these contributions. In other
words, each user contributes information to the complete state
of the VE, and each user obtains their own (device dependent)
perception of the complete state. This means that each CMR
effectively has a fuzzy layer of states defined by the combination
of sensors which could be vulnerable to various attacks. More
dangerously, it is also entirely possible that no-one has a complete
picture of the VEs state at all times meaning it is challenging to
verify correct and secure behaviour.
We can more formally define the complexities of state in
CMRs by borrowing terms from Marsh et al. (2006) subjective
and objective reality concepts from the Deva Architecture (also
see Pettifer et al., 2000) for shared VEs. Marsh et al. (2006)
characterise behaviour of entities in shared VEs in terms of their
objective (that is, part of the synchronised, semantic state of
the environment) or subjective state (part of what is necessary
to best-portray the correct interpretation of the objective state
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FIGURE 2 | Attackers can operate in a Threat Environment (external forces to a system). Threat actors can interact with a System Environment (architecture/topology)
directly or indirectly, and subsequently (once compromised) attack the Virtual Environment (graphics).
to the user). This is akin to differentiating between the world
around us and our actual perception of it. These ideas are
useful to encapsulate the situation in CMRs, particularly where
users contribute information to the overall state from a broad
and diverse range of devices and sensors. For the purposes
of this paper, we will call them Core Model (objective state)
and Additional Models (subjective states). We add to these
definitions, the unified Model (the sum of the core and all
additional models, here represented as a doughnut circle) of the
CMR which is the sum of all potential contributions from every
participant in the CMR. This unified CMRdepends onwhom and
what is connected at any given time and the capabilities of their
individual I/O hardware, sensors and states. The Core Model
is that which any participant with a minimum viable setup can
access (see Figure 3).
Some examples include:
• Render one or more component of a CMR unusable, or
have it misbehave, either by bricking (rendering permanently
unusable) the component, temporarily flooding it so it
cannot perform as expected (denial of service), or misbehave
(affecting the integrity of the system).
• Identity theft on CMR platforms. Compromising a CMR
system can enable an attacker to pose as a legitimate user
and manipulate others to reveal other sensitive data or
manipulate them to behave in a manner in which they
normally would not. Such behaviour can have serious financial
and reputational consequences.
• Health risks. Griefing (see Chesney et al., 2009), trolling and
cyber bullying on the Internet are not new concepts, but it
translates straightforwardly into CMR applications. Online
activities of this sort have also been linked to cases of suicide
(see Hinduja and Patchin, 2010). Another health risk can be
to compromise a system intended for simulation and training.
For example, an application for studying and learning to
treat schizophrenia using VR, (see Freeman, 2008), or other
mental health issues, (see Gregg and Tarrier, 2007), could be
compromised to teach bad practice or to have detrimental
effects on victims (e.g., cause nausea or exacerbate the victim’s
mental health disease).
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FIGURE 3 | A conceptualisation of the threat landscape in which attack actors can operate. Despite the attacker being confined to a Core Model, they have the
potential to intrude and compromise the Unified CMR (all models) because of the relationship between models that is often readily available in CMR applications. This
approach is akin to a publish/subscribe model, in which the expected areas in the circle are only accessible to those devices with the right sensors and that subscribe
to that part of the circle. Of note: this does not preclude any attacker from attacking other models (even if those sensors that make up those models are not
accessible to the device), as the attack can still go through the core model.
• Personal data utilisation for social manipulation (rather
than persuasion). We have seen how utilisation of personal
data on social media can help manipulate large audiences
through fake news and online propaganda, which is argued
to have had a dramatic effect on the US election (see Persily,
2017). Content displayed to users can be projected based
on psychological profiling (eye-gaze data can for instance
expose a range of proclivities). With MR and CMR systems
evolving, it will be necessary to consider how perception and
manipulation of VE content through such social manipulation
techniques can affect end-users. A particular factor that
magnifies the risks and harm possible with security violations
in CMRs is the plasticity of the human mind (see Madary and
Metzinger, 2016 for a detailed discussion).
4.4. I/O Attack Model
In this section we outline our input/box/output/integration
exposure (I/O Attack) model. For our attack surface, similar
to De Guzman et al. (2018), we consider the whole system
that is necessary for the CMR (see Figure 4). The attack
surface can be considered to be like a data-flow pipeline. This
model is loosely inspired by Oliveira et al. (2009), the key
difference being we look at the analysis domain from the
attacker’s perspective. We assume that every device, and every
sub-component of the device can have this model applied to
it. We break down the attack surface into: Input concerns all
interfaces that consume data from the real world (including
device sensors, end-user inputs, physical wires, etc.). Box
is a shorthand notation for a black/grey or white box, a
common term in software engineering. It is any subsystem
that a stakeholder can directly or indirectly access. Inside it,
some processing takes place to modify the input according to
the requirements and specification of the developer. Output
concerns the processed data passed from one subsystem to
another. Output concerns the outgoing data from a box. Output
may be input for another subsystem, or it may also be the final
destination for the processed data (e.g., a display). Integration
(the black outline of the figure) concerns the interplay between
all components of the system. While as separate units, they
may behave within acceptable thresholds, it may be that the
system as a whole, when viewed altogether, may misbehave as a
consequence of an attack, which may not be detectable by any
single component.
4.4.1. Input
Given the Data and State model as described in Figure 3, we
assume that multiple subsystems can interface with each other
in sequences (like a daisy chain). Stakeholders may be in a
position in which they have no control of this sequence, one
subsystem’s input will be another subsystem’s output (and vice
versa). We consider the input and output attack surface to
consist of components pertaining to: raw data; data transfer;
manipulation of real-world information; andmanipulation of the
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FIGURE 4 | Input/box/output/integration (I/O Attack Model) describes the constituent components that are exposed to (and can be compromised by) the attacker.
semantic meaning of the user-level application of information
in question.
• Application is comprised of a combination of rendering to
form different varieties of realism that the user interprets (see,
for instance Ferwerda, 2003, although we expand the idea of
realism to other senses than vision alone). Attackers may for
instance manipulate the interpreted meaning in the content of
the VE.
• Conversion is the part of the pipeline that converts one type
of signal into another through sensing (transformation, input)
or projection (rendering, output).
– Transformation (input) includes the low level processes of
converting between real world, digital and synthetic signals.
Inputs considers converting real world and synthetic signals
into digital data to be communicated/transported.
– Rendering (output) includes the sensory information that
can be attacked, such as for instance: visual, audio, tactile,
olfactory. We regard this as being the information that
is projected in some form (e.g., display, speaker, haptic
device or digital scent emitter). Attackers may for instance
manipulate the content of the VE.
• Communications includes protocols necessary to
transmit/transfer the data. Attackers may for instance
manipulate the content of the VE.
• Data includes the data buffers themselves.
• Physical includes the hardware itself, such as cables and
monitors necessary to receive (input) or transmit/transfer
(output) data.
We cautiously observe that the attack surface of the input/output
is in similar to that of the OSI model. While a comparison
may be useful conceptually, we note that these are analogous
rather than “equivalent to” comparisons, specifically because
wireless inputs/outputs will be equivalent to the OSI model,
whereas transmissions and transfers over cables will not be
(architecturally speaking).
4.4.2. Box
In our work, we assume that there are many types of boxes that
all follow the black/grey/white box paradigm. Black boxes has the
subsystem not visible to engineers and developers who did not
design the system. Grey boxes have parts of the system visible
and modifiable to other (including users), and white boxes have
the entire architecture visible and modifiable. The attack surface
is dependent on box functionalities, software and hardware
they incorporate. As CMR applications are still immature and
evolving, we break down the criteria for being considered a box
into mandatory and optional criteria, as well as what these may
mean for the attack surface:
• Mandatory criteria:
– Processing/computation. There must be some
processing or computation involved (other than signal
transformations).
– Access to Persistent storage. There must exist a unified,
additional and core models.
– Sharing/networking capabilities aiming at sharing
processed or stored data.
• Optional criteria, i.e., a system built with security in mind is
likely to also have:
– Authentication considers access controls, so the users only
have access to what they should be seeing at any time.
– Encryption aims at ensuring privacy for the user.
Each of these boxes, each a standalone unit in their own
right, dependent on hardware, software and network topology
configurations will dictate how open to attack exposure a
box is. The attacker can modify a box to for instance:
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misbehave, leak information, prevent authorised users from
accessing their systems, or render the box unusable. Examples of
boxes include:
• Desktop computers, mobile phones, laptops and servers.
These boxes will contain a number of subboxes, such as GPUs,
CPUs, RAM etc.
• Head-mounted displays such as Oculus, Vive or other
AR/MR glasses.
• IoT devices that use sensors, but that also have additional
processing capabilities to augment the sensed data.
• Wearables such as smart watches, fitbits, clothes.
• Assistants such as Google Assistant, Alexa and Siri.
• Software processes such as tracker drivers or the VR
compositor (e.g., WebVR https://webvr.info/).
While the link between MR and IoT is tenuous, we
believe this will strengthen as more IoT devices become
available, and MR devices become common. More recently
for instance, consumer untethered VR headsets have
become available.
4.4.3. Integration
The integration (part of the attack surface) considers that
the interplay between the individual components can be
manipulated by the attacker by considering the system
as a whole (rather than constituent components). Human-
level manipulation plays a significantly larger role than
technical ones in the integration as some attacks are disguised
as regular usage of the system. Example attack vectors
may include:
• Reconnaissance. An attacker wishing to identify how their
node/device on the CMR application can influence the rest of
the SE and VE. Attackers may use reconnaissance activities as
part of a larger attack Hutchins et al. (2011).
• Social engineering. An attacker can influence users to do their
bidding, for instance because the other users have legitimate
access, or to frame other users or manipulate them into
nefarious activities.
• Identity theft. An attacker can hijack and pose as another user
in a CMR application. As different levels of abstraction can
play a role in CMR applications through the uses of avatars,
other users may not notice that the victim’s identity has been
compromised before the attacker has acted on their objectives.
• Imbued behaviour Pettifer and Marsh (2001) highlight for
instance how functionality can be imbued upon an entity by
the VE in which it is created. Such functionsmay be “enforced”
by an environment (thus being a “law of the world”) whilst
others are optional. This escalation of functionality (such as
privileges) could give attackers unfair advantages, especially in
social contexts or VEs where real world benefits may result.
For instance, the attacker winning a game of “CMR poker”
because they are privy to other users’ cards.
Again, as the CMR application space is still evolving and not
particularly mature, we suspect the types of attack vectors are
likely to grow over time. The purpose of our I/O Attack model is
to demonstrate which parts of a pipeline the attacker can exploit.
We provide further examples of integration attacks in section 5.
4.5. Attack Taxonomy
Each model provides a different lens for viewing the different
attacks, and describes varying scopes of attacks that enable more
straightforward reasoning about potential kinds of attacks. We
envisage that other models can also be incorporated into the
taxonomy. Since this taxonomy is general and provides a way to
reason in the context of specific applications we outline inTable 1
some high level consequences. These could range from “Users
stop using the systems,” “Loss of Trust,” “Personal Data Leak” and
so on. However, these consequences are application dependent.
An excellent article discussing hate in social media outlines some
potential consequences in the context of social VR (https://www.
adl.org/resources/reports/hate-in-social-virtual-reality#hopes-
and-fears-for-the-future-of-social-virtual-reality). For example,
“harassment,” “racism,” “anti-semitism,” “bullying” etc. To make
the high-level consequences of our taxonomy more concrete,
the reader is referred to the case studies in section 5 which list
some more context specific consequences based on the CMR
application types.
Our taxonomy builds on assimilating three key categories
of (observable) properties about the attack surface, attacker and
consequences (impacts) to allow analysts to formulate their own
descriptions of attacks:
• Lens: from which perspective to view the attack? No model is
fully accurate or precisely describes all attacks. We assume
that any model used, provides a different perspective on an
attack (i.e., uses a different lens). In our paper, we have
developed three different models, specifically designed with
CMR application use cases in mind. However, we envisage
that any attack model that applies to CMR applications can
be applied here.
• Attack Surface Property:what properties must be present prior
to the attack? These can be technological or human-centred,
such as policies, vulnerabilities, perimeter (e.g., firewall),
physical, (network) architecture paradigm (e.g., client-server),
device (host), person, application and data. This is like
mapping the CMR system to that of defense in depth/perimeter
defense, see Smith (2003).
TABLE 1 | Taxonomy of the CMR application attack surface.
Lens Attack surface
property
Attacker behaviour Consequence
<Model> <Policy> <Action> <Monetary>
<TBE> <Perimeter> <Attack Vector> <Reputational/Trust>
<Physical> <Choice> <Political>
<Architecture> <TBE> <Health>
<Device> <Cultural>
<Person> <Legal>
<Application> <CIA>
<Data> <TBE>
<TBE>
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• Attacker Behaviour: what does the attacker need to do to
compromise the CMR application? This includes attack vectors
and actions necessary to execute attacks. To facilitate the
identification of these properties, analysts may also make good
use of UML, message sequence charts, flow charts, attack
graphs or formal methods (including model checking), w.r.t.
the attack surface properties. From the behaviours we can
identify the part of the attack surface the attacker needs
to exploit.
• Consequence: what are the indirect and direct outcomes
(impact) of the attack? Note that the term consequence is
specifically used here to denote a reaction or effect of the
attack. This can be inconsequential, i.e., without any impact
or harm. Net detrimental effects is harm, consequences could
also be net positive (e.g., lessons learnt from an attack
meant that some users who previously regarded security
as not important, now do take it seriously and were able
to withstand a more significant attack not that far ahead
in the future), or no positive or negative effect may be
measured at all.
Combined, each category paints an accurate picture of the
building blocks that make up an entire attack surface.
Our taxonomy accommodates future directions of CMR
applications research, and can also be used in the IoT
space and in traditional network defense research (see
Table 1). Where <TBE> is present, we explicitly mean To
Be Extended with other future models, properties, behaviours
or consequences.
In essence, we consider the taxonomy also able to predict
outcomes by considering how:
Models (Lenses) give different perspectives of: Attack Surface
Properties + Attacker Behaviour→ Consequences. Note here that
consequences is used as a generic term to denote both impact
(typically used to describe effects of attacks in the digital space)
and harms more broadly.
We take a simple approach of describing attack surface
properties, attacker behaviours and consequences in short
sentences or single words using different perspectives. These
different models (e.g., attack graphs or attack trees) can be used
to describe attributes in the taxonomy. Viewing different attacker
behaviour descriptions using different models, for instance,
may enable enhanced cognition among security practitioners
and researchers allowing for lateral thinking among users of
our taxonomy.
Attacks against CMR applications are not well-known,
we consider it highly important to explore threats to CMR
applications and their users. As a catalyst to derive likely attacks
in our taxonomy, we describe threat awareness of attacks using
the basic classification scheme, as described by Chismon and
Ruks (2015):
• Known knowns: a threat that is well-understood and we have
techniques to prevent or mitigate the threat.
• Known unknowns: a threat that has been identified (i.e., we
know of its existence), but that we do not know any details
about it.
• Unknown unknowns: a threat we know nothing about, not
even its existence.
A key motivation of this position paper is to deliver a framework
that allows stakeholders to systematically identify and consider
threats posed by attackers. We can do so by considering how
threats are first “unknown unknowns,” then “known unknowns,”
and then eventually “known knowns.” By scoping threats
through our framework, CMR application stakeholders can
straightforwardly reason about threats that may actuate into
attacks on their particular CMR attack surface, and better defend
against them.
5. CMR ATTACK USE-CASE STUDIES
We briefly analyse four use cases reasoned using our framework,
presenting these in the form of our attack taxonomy. These case
studies are sourced from typical CVE and CMR applications
implemented by other researchers. Specifically, a range of
collaborative virtual prototyping for engineering design
(see Gomes De Sá and Gabriel, 1999; Kan et al., 2001; Glencross
et al., 2007), virtual try on (see Kartsounis et al., 2003; Kim and
Forsythe, 2008), and health-care applications (see Rizzo and Kim,
2005; Fujita et al., 2010) and gaming have been proposed over
the last few decades. Although, we focus on just four illustrative
use cases, there are of course many more application scenarios
in social, entertainment, interior design, training etc. For
brevity, we consider limited example attack behaviours in our
instantiation of the taxonomy for each use case. It is not possible
to perform an exhaustive analysis of the entire attack surface for
each use case within the scope of this paper, instead we show the
reasoning is extendable. We include in supplementary materials
a more thorough analysis for one use case.
5.1. Use Case 1: Industrial Espionage
The first scenario we examine is that of a targeted industrial
espionage attack of a CMR application used for prototyping
or engineering design. In this situation, the CMR has some
information relating to valuable intellectual property (IP),
perhaps in the form of computer-aided design (CAD, for
example a hypothetical shared version of VR Rolls Royce Engine
design https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CyMzFenEuNI)
models, simulation or industrial know how. We consider this
scenario to adopt a broadly client-server architecture and list
some considerations in Table 2. The potential for physical
consequences can arise from denial of service attacks that
could reduce framerate on target devices inducing nausea
and/or frustration with the usability of the application. In
CMR engineering applications, exploiting vulnerabilities in
connected cameras to spy on users of the system can also lead to
psychological harms, for instance: a colleague may blackmail or
coerce another as a consequence of spying.
5.2. Use Case 2: Virtual Try-On
In this scenario, we examine the considerations involved with a
virtual try-on application. Many such applications are emerging
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TABLE 2 | Use Case 1: Industrial Espionage.
Lens Attack surface property Attacker behaviour Consequence
Environment Valuable IP Theft Reputation/Monetary
model User Acceptance DDoS/DoS Users stop using the systems
Insider Access Control Escalated Privileges System Misuse
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
Data and Simulation Theft CIA of Sim. Data Affected
State model 3D Model Design Theft IP theft/Monetary
Collaboration Model DDoS/Dos Collaboration Impossible
Multiple Users Spoofing Loss of Trust
Administrative Data Theft Personal Data Leak
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
I/O Attack Central Server DDoS/DoS Access Limitation
model Central Server DDoS/DoS Induced Nausea
Simulation Theft Monetary
3D Model Design Theft Monetary/IP
Camera Data Cyber Spying Psychological Harm
Administrative Data Theft Monetary Cost
Collaboration Model DDoS/DoS Usability Limitation
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
that offer users the ability to try on anything from eyewear to
clothing and to visualise these before buying. Indeed Amazon
has recently patented a blended reality virtual mirror which aims
to allow users to try on virtual clothes (https://www.theverge.
com/circuitbreaker/2018/1/3/16844300/amazon-patent-mirror-
virtual-clothes-fashion). Again, in this scenario, we consider this
type of application to adopt a broadly client-server architecture
and list considerations in the Table 3. This application scenario
has the potential for a range of privacy threats and personal
psychological harms that can arise from access to and misuse of
personal data. The degree of harm done to targets, is also far from
uniform as the psychological impact on an individual will depend
on their own prior experience, state of mind, vulnerabilities,
personal body image as well as what the attacker actually does
with the data. For example, an attacker might use the data to
body shame, cyber stalk and bully the target of the attack. A
parallel can be drawn with the celebrity hacking scandal, in
which Apple’s iCloud server was compromised and a collection
of almost 500 private photos (some containing nudity) of various
celebrities, mostly women, were posted on the imageboard 4chan
(https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/01/naked-
celebrity-hack-icloud-backup-jennifer-lawrence).
5.3. Use Case 3: Health-Care: Virtual
Doctor
In this scenario, we consider a health-care application which
enables consultation with a virtual doctor. A number of different
network architectures have been proposed for such applications,
but we consider specifically the one-to-one consultation scenario.
For this reason, we cast it in a broadly peer to peer network
architecture, even though some application data could well be
held in a central location. Like the previous use case, this one
also has potential for very serious privacy threats, personal,
psychological and even medical harms that might arise from an
attack. A particular threat could be someone masquerading as a
doctor and manipulating the user to cause them physical harms.
Another potential threat is one where a third person enters the
consultation uninvited, which could cause significant feelings of
violation and loss of trust in the application.
Much like the previous use case, the level of harm possible to
an individual is very dependent on their own mental, physical,
medical condition as well as the specifics of how the attacker
exploits the system. There is a further key requirement of a
high level of confidentiality of communication in the system to
engender trust and acceptance by users. If users lose this trust,
they may discontinue an essential therapy. We outline these
in Table 4.
5.4. Use Case 4: Shared Gaming
In this scenario, we examine the considerations involved in
gaming applications (see also Table 5). Gaming is possibly the
most mature of the use cases provided in this paper, as many
implementations of CMR-like solutions already exist, so this is by
no means an exhaustive list. Gaming allows for many connected
devices to collaborate to a shared goal, often bound by the rules
of the game in question.
Social attacks: Gaming can be manipulated at the social level
through social engineering. Example user can manipulate other
players into believing they are another player by masquerading
as them (identify theft is often mitigated in several games, esp.
MMORPGs, today by providing a unique identifier that other
players can examine.), or bully or discriminated against other
players, or manipulate other players in-game to conduct real-
world actions they normally would not do. For instance. virtual
assets can be confiscated and held hostage by another player.
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TABLE 3 | Use Case 2: Virtual Try-On.
Lens Attack Surface Property Attacker Behaviour Consequence
Environment Body Image Sensitivity Social Engineering Psychological Harm
model Demographic Vulnerability Stalking/Bullying Psychological/Physical Harm
Predisposition to sharing Shaming Online Reputation Harm
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
Data and Body Model/Avatar Deep Fakes & Theft Reputation Harm
State model Garment Design Theft Copying/Fashion Fakes
Fabric Simulation Theft/Manipulation Retail Monetary Loss
User Credential Data Theft Access/Monetary Loss
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
I/O Attack Central Server DDoS/DoS Access Limitation
model Central Server DDoS/DoS Induced Nausea
Central Server DDoS/DoS Retail Monetary Loss
Personal Camera Data Shaming online Reputation Harm
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
Technical attacks: Attackers can manipulate bugs,
vulnerabilities or weaknesses of the game system to cheat,
whether this be for competitive advantage or for the amusement
of the attacker. Latency-issues during gameplay is often
addressed by the server to give players an even playing field. This
well-meaning latency handicap can be misused by the attacker
to gain a competitive advantage. Sophisticated attackers might
also be able to manipulate what is rendered on screen to other
players, or steal bank details from their accounts.
Socio-technical attacks: Players can be stalked by other
players through IP address retrieval, leading to scenarios in
which one player fears for their well-being. Attackers can also
manipulate the rules of the game for their own advantage,
whether this is financial gain (e.g., exploiting a bug to gain
significant amount of in-game currency), cause reputational
harm to a player or game developer. The mix of heterogeneous
sensors that CMRs are likely to include in the future, many of
which borrowed from the IoT space, are likely to increase the
attack surface substantially. Game players may collude, sharing
resources to flood the connection of other players.
6. DISCUSSION: DEFENSE STRATEGIES
6.1. Recommendations
6.1.1. Address Low-Hanging Fruit
Many security practices exist in other systems today, esp.
those involving sanitation of inputs and outputs. De Guzman
et al. (2018) has already pointed out a number of these
efforts, including:
• intrinsic input sanitisation such as user inputs or well-
formedness checks.
• context-based sanitisation such as checking for the contextual
meaning of assets, or this could also mean malicious behavior
in the CMR application itself (even if the input is clean, the
higher level interpretation of the input may not be).
• video/output sanitisation to check well-formedness
of output.
• extrinsic input sanitization such as those that relate to privacy
preferences by end users.
• protection through abstraction such as revoking untrusted
applications’ access to any raw input feeds.
• protection through encryption can keep information
confidential between parties if protected with basic
end-to-end encryption.
• secret sharing or secure multi-party computation (i.e.,
splitting the secret across multiple trusted parties). Data can be
split among untrusted parties such that information can only
be inferred when the distributed parts are together.
• gesture- and physiological-based authentication (including
biometrics) such as continuous authentication and device
attestation techniques can provide assurances that the items
in questions and end-users have not been hampered with.
Other sanitization or run-time checking methods may be
implemented to ensure players behave according to the rules of
the system, check expected throughput and volume of data fall
within acceptable thresholds (e.g., spammers and content being
sent across the wire). Monitoring of user patterns may be enough
to identify anomalous behaviour, however, this may be used in an
attack if an adversary if they escalate their privileges.
6.1.2. Educate Users About Attack Surfaces and
Defenses
In section 2, we discuss that educating users is a proactive
measure to detect attacks, as well as increase victims’
threshold for malicious behaviour (to not be “as affected”
by attacker harms). Both are non-trivial tasks. CMR
attacks are poorly understood, because many have yet
to be conducted in real systems. Furthermore, with the
attacker-defender also being an arms race, some victims
eventually might become attackers after they have been
compromised. If security literacy increases overall, this
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TABLE 4 | Use Case 3: Health-care: Virtual Doctor.
Lens Attack Surface Property Attacker Behaviour Consequence
Environment Confidentiality Spoofing/Appearing Loss of Trust
model Mental Health Manipulation Psychological Harm
Physical Condition Manipulation Physical Harm
Suggestivity Manipulation Legal Consequences
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
Data and Treatment Simulator Theft Physical/Psychological Harm
State model Treatment History Theft Loss of Trust/Privacy
Treatment Plan Theft/Manipulation Loss of Trust/Physical Harm
Patient Credentials Theft Spoofing Physical/Psychological Harm
Practicioner Credentials Theft/Spoofing Legal Consequences
Medical Data Theft Loss of Trust/Privacy
Medical Data Sale Legal Consequences
Medical Data Manipulation Incorrect Diagnosis
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
I/O Attack Peer-to-Peer DoS Access Limitation
model Central server DDoS/DoS Induced Nausea
Camera Data Theft/DoS Loss of Trust/Usability
Microphone Data Theft/DoS Loss of Trust/Usability
Medical Sensors Theft/DoS/Manipulation Physical Harm
Real-time Response DoS Efficacy of treatment
interface modifications DoS Access Limitation
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
TABLE 5 | Use Case 4: Shared Gaming.
Lens Attack Surface Property Attacker Behaviour Consequence
Environment Vulnerable Demographic Bullying/Discrimination Stop Playing
model Socially Dependent Bullying/Manipulation Monetary/Psychological harm
Personal Insecurity Manipulation Player Disadvantaged
Body Image Bullying Legal/Psychological Harm
Mental Health Bullying Depression/Suicide
Suggestivity Manipulation Player Disadvantaged
Location Stalking Fear/Physical Harm
Group Dynamics Spoofing Loss of Reputation
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
Data and Game Simulation DDoS/Manipulation Monetary Loss
State model Joining Credentials Theft Access Limitation
Group/Team Membership Escalate Privileges Unfair Advantage
Player Identity Spoofing/Theft Loss of Trust/Privacy
Multiple Players DDoS Loss of Causality
Player Assets Theft Monetary Cost
Game Levels Cheating Unfair Advantage
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
I/O Attack Peer-to-Peer DoS Flooding/Access Denial
model Central server DDoS/DoS Induced Nausea
Camera Data Theft/Sale Loss of Trust/Usability
Microphone Data Theft/Sale/DoS Loss of Trust/Usability
GPS/location Data Stalking/Harassment Physical/Psychological harm
Camera/Microphone/GPS Theft/Sale/Harassment Legal Consequences
<TBE> <TBE> <TBE> <TBE>
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may help defenders in the short term, but the asymmetric
relationship between attackers and defenders is an
arms race.
6.1.3. Explore Applications of Detection Systems
In traditional network security: IDSs/IPSs are hardware and
software sensors dedicated tomonitor and analyse network traffic
data, log files and other system call traces to detect attacks. We
postulate it is possible to employ IDSs and IPSs to detect attacks
posed to CMR systems. Specifically, we believe we can deploy
intrusion detection sensors at the various parts of the attack
surface: input, box, outputs and integration of the SE.
Additional sensors may be deployed to identify semantic
issues in VEs (integration). These types of detection systems
would be far more complex than detection systems today, in that
they must be able to take human context (e.g., to what degree
a hijacking is a joke) into consideration as well. Data sent for
analysis to detect malicious activities or policy violations needs
to produce reports to a management station (e.g., a security
operation centre). To the best of our knowledge, neither of these
types of systems have been implemented for CMR applications.
Two classes of detection methods exist: misuse detection and
anomaly detection Liao et al. (2013). Misuse detection works by
identifying actions that match patterns (signatures) of known
attacks. The severity of misuse signatures is determined by
how much the analyst who set the rule believes that the attack
pattern in question matters (intrinsically). Misuse detection
rules range from simple well-formedness and validation checks
in data to keeping track of system states. Anomaly detection
on the other hand look for actions that significantly deviate
from “normal behaviour.” Normal behaviour is often defined
by statistical deviations of features being monitored. These
systems will look to statistically-based (no prior knowledge
about the system necessary), knowledge-based (Prior knowledge
about system necessary) and machine-learning based (algorithm
learns normal behaviour over time) normal behaviour. IPSs may
also provide measures for automating fixing-of-abuse. However,
both IDSs and IPSs are prone to generate a plethora of false
positives, and should therefore be used experimentally to detect
potential intrusions.
6.1.4. Develop CMR Applications Aimed at
Collaborative Intrusion Detection
Zhou et al. (2010) describe various architectures for collaboration
in intrusion detection, including: a centralised correlation
unit, hierarchical approaches and fully distributed architectures.
Vasilomanolakis et al. (2015) describe a taxonomy that is
broken down into: Local Monitoring; Membership Management;
Correlation and Aggregation; Data Dissemination; Global
Monitoring. CMR applications may play a larger role in
collaborations across different cyber security analysis teams in
the future. Systems could be developed to support sharing of
CTI. We should consider how such systems can be best leveraged
by security analysts, but also consider how these systems can be
attacked. The attacker may wish to exploit each of these aspects
in the Collaborative IDS (CIDS) taxonomy, which we would need
to consider how to protect.
6.1.5. Develop Metrics or Assessments for Harm
We characterise the perceived distance of a security breach from
individuals in reasoning about the level of harm and potential
long term psychological impact. For example, victims of burglary,
display long term psychological impacts from the very personal
violation of their home (see Beaton et al., 2000), similarly
victims of identity theft suffer long term psychological harm
(see Roberts et al., 2013). In contrast, we speculate that victims of
security threats such as denial of service attacks, loss of National
Health Service data and loss of password/personal data stored
on company servers are potentially less harmed psychologically
as the crime is perceived to be distant i.e., affecting the
companies/organisations rather than the individuals whose data
has been breached. Stealing an avatar, or masquerading as
another player is also another example of identity theft.
6.1.6. Use Distributed Ledgers Critically
Li et al. (2017) present a survey of the security of blockchain
systems. Distributed ledgers such as blockchain may provide
assurances that a sequence of events have been executed in
order. This method could provide reassurance that the current
core model of the system (e.g., SE and VE) is correct, but
should any CMR system wish to employ a smart contract
architecture, this system will also be susceptible to smart contract
attacks and misuse and stakeholders should follow common
best-practices in security (https://consensys.github.io/smart-
contract-best-practices/known_attacks/). In an environment in
which much transient information (users dropping in and out,
i.e., overlapping states), there may be an unmanageable problem
of maintaining verifiable subjective and unified states even with a
blockchain solution.
DuPont (2017) describes a form of algorithmic governance: a
short-lived experiment to create a “Decentralised Autonomous
Organisation” (The DAO) on the Ethereum blockchain. Within
days the DAO’s code was exploited by an attacker who used
unintended behaviour of the code’s logic to rapidly drain funds
worth 3.7m in Ethereum tokens. The DAO, demonstrates how
the use of smart contracts can automate large portions of a
system. CMR applications could expand to include automation
in governance, but any automation should be continually peer-
reviewed by and managed by a human for the foreseeable future
to prevent similar attacks occurring in CMR applications.
6.2. Benefits and Disadvantages of our
Framework
We believe the key benefits of our approach are:
• It comprehensively considers the grand challenges of the
future in CMR to a degree that no previous work has
previously investigated.
• It is an abstract-based reasoning approach which allows for
the benefit of making use of different levels of abstractions
to protect a CMR architecture from different types of cyber
attacks with potentially socio-technical harm (in particular
psychological and health-related harms). It is an aggressive
approach to identify and address security concerns, first
and foremost aimed at enabling stakeholders to more
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straightforwardly understand and reason about the MR and
CMR attack surface, by considering the inputs, processing,
outputs and integration of existing systems.
• It is a starting point for research into CMR attack surfaces,
intended to provoke discussions and research.
Key limitations of our approach are:
• It is largely conceptual. Presently, our framework is
very conceptual as it stands, with little empirical or
experimental evidence to support the assertion that our
approach will be successful for real, and in particular large
scale CMR applications.
• It lacks specificity. Our approach aims to be generic enough
to fit most conceivably directions that CMR applications may
take in the future, at the cost of specificity. This also opens up
the possibility of each research project using the framework
differently, making it challenging to ensure that projects apply
as intended.
6.3. Future Directions of Research
Roesner et al. (2014a), Sluganovic et al. (2017), and De Guzman
et al. (2018) are examples that demonstrate how use cases need
to be developed to consider security and safety issues in CMR
devices. In particular, we see a need to exhaustively examine how
CMR systems are likely to be used, develop secure protocols
to support both usability as well as security and safety aspects
of such systems, while also being able to develop techniques to
detect compromises and nefarious activities will be key issues
moving forward.
The CMR landscape today is likely to look very different
5 years from now. In preparation for this, we argue it is
important to advance research by expanding our work in these
key areas:
• Empirical and experimental evidence. A number of use cases
have to be tested and executed in production environments
to identify how well our model can reflect reality. We
believe that our abstraction-by-design approach gives analysts
and researchers the flexibility to develop new use cases.
Use cases should be tested with concrete research questions
and hypothesis testing. For instance, Marsh et al. (2006)’s
idea of imbuing credentials: can this be done legitimately or
by the attacker?
• Development of further use cases of attacks. Further use
cases will enable other analysts and security researchers to start
from templated examples of attacks to form ones that are more
relevant for their own environments.
• Extending the taxonomy. We have already discussed that the
taxonomy is not exhaustive, and that further use-cases will
inform the value of the taxonomy and its ability to predict
consequences. Formalisation of certain properties may also be
a possibility. Other models can also be incorporated into the
framework, and used in the taxonomy to describe behaviour
and attack surface properties. Earlier, we described how attack
graphs may be one approach to describe attacker behaviours.
This does however mean that our taxonomy is incomplete,
this is by design to future-proof the approach. Eventually,
we aim to provide a detailed resource for the research
community: a template of building blocks that researchers
use to reason about, and model likely CMR threats based on
known characteristics about the attack surface and attacker.
For instance, if we know the CMR application uses avatars, we
may then provide the building blocks to start reasoning about
topics such as identify theft.
• Metrics and function development. Further work should
investigate socio-technical aspects of CMR security that
will be required to understand the relationships between
taxonomy properties in order to accurately and precisely
predict consequences, perhaps through simulation or post-
incident analysis.
• Attack detection tool development IDS and IPS like tools can
and should be deployed for CMRs.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed and investigated grand challenges
areas in CMR security, and discussed the degree to which
potential harms may result from attacks. We have discussed
mitigation strategies and IDS approaches to detect possible
indicators of compromise, and how to begin to reduce the
CMR attack surface. Use cases presented in this paper are not
exhaustive and the taxonomy proposed is extendable by design.
We only regard them as a starting point for future research.
We assume that many attack vectors are not immediately
obvious from our present-day understanding of CMR security.
In preparation to tackle these challenges, we therefore deem
it necessary to propose an extendable taxonomy which can
be used as an abstraction-based reasoning approach to detect,
mitigate, combat and deter CMR attacks. This work has been
largely exploratory from desktop analysis, chiefly to provoke a
discussion on the state of security in CMR today, or rather,
lack thereof. We hope that results from this research will
help establish a more fundamental, scientific foundation for
security of CMR applications. CMR applications are likely to
integrate with heterogeneous sensors. We anticipate that in the
following decades there will be an convergence toward a Smart
Extended Reality (SXR).What this means at this stage is currently
uncertain, however this framework shows the need to consider
how attacks can be executed and the harms that can come from
them in order to develop better defense strategies.
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